The Boom Not The Slump: The Right Time For Austerity by Jayadev, Arjun & Konczal, Mike
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Economics Faculty Publication Series Economics
8-23-2010
The Boom Not The Slump: The Right Time For
Austerity
Arjun Jayadev
University of Massachusetts Boston, arjun.jayadev@umb.edu
Mike Konczal
The Roosevelt Institute
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, and the Political Economy
Commons
This Research Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economics Faculty Publication Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more information, please contact
library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jayadev, Arjun and Konczal, Mike, "The Boom Not The Slump: The Right Time For Austerity" (2010). Economics Faculty Publication
Series. Paper 26.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/econ_faculty_pubs/26
“The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity 
at the Treasury.” - John Maynard Keynes (1937) 
Collected Writings
Should the United States cut its deficit in the short 
term?    This has been the subject of intense debate 
among politicians, policy analysts and thinkers over the 
past year.   What are the consequences of cu!ing the 
deficit with interest rates low, unemployment high and 
growth uncertain?
A recent paper by Alberto F. Alesina and Silvia Ardagna 
(2009), “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus 
Spending” (henceforth A & A), looks at a cross section of 
deficit reduction policies among di"erent countries. It 
examines examples where large-scale deficit reduction is 
associated with economic expansion and where the 
debt-to-GDP ratio falls in the medium-term (3 years 
a#er the adjustment).  Based on this research, many 
popular commentators suggest that the U.S. can adopt 
such a policy and grow.1
However, upon a further examination of the data such a 
conclusion is unmerited.  The overwhelming majority of 
the episodes used by A & A did not see deficit reduction 
in the middle of a slump. Where they did, it o#en 
resulted in a decline in the subsequent growth rate or an 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Of the 26 episodes 
that they identify as ‘expansionary’, in virtually none did 
the country a) reduce the deficit when the economy was 
in a slump and b) increase growth rates while reducing 
the debt-to-GDP ratio.  The sole example not covered 
by those two qualifiers can be explained by a 
combination of two policy maneuvers that are not easily 
available to the U.S. at the moment: currency 
depreciation and interest rate reduction.
We expand on their initial examination and cover the 
entire data set of 107 observations, finding very li!le 
evidence for success when cu!ing in a slump—in our 
terminology, when the growth rate in the previous year 
was lower than the average growth rate over the past 
three years.  Only one additional case out of 107 can be 
seen as an example of success in fiscal consolidation, 
and we show that this does not bear scrutiny either.
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Key Findings
• Countries historically do not cut their deficits in a 
slump, instead addressing these problems during a non-
recessionary time.
• When countries cut in a slump, it o#en results in lower 
growth and/or higher debt-to-GDP ratios.  In very few 
circumstances are countries able to successfully cut 
during a slump, and this happens only when either 
interest rates and/or the exchange rates fall sharply.
• In our analysis, we find that there is no episode in 
which a country facing the same circumstances as the 
United States (recent recession, low interest rates, high 
unemployment) has cut its deficit and succeeded in 
reducing its debt through growth.
• We conclude that there is li!le evidence provided by A 
& A that cu!ing the federal deficit in the short-term, 
under the conditions the United States currently faces, 
would improve the country’s prospects. It may even 
make the United States’ situation far worse.
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Background
A & A find what they consider to be evidence of 
episodes in which “spending cuts adopted to reduce 
deficits have been associated with economic expansions 
rather than recessions.”   A & A suggest the episodes 
they’ve isolated show that reducing the deficit can lead 
to an increase in growth. They then use these examples 
as a basis for investigating the optimal way to reduce the 
deficit.
But what are these examples, and how useful are they to 
the United States’ current situation?  A & A use a panel 
of OECD countries from 1970 to 2007.   The countries 
included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
A & A filter this data to find episodes of fiscal 
adjustment by capturing years in which the primary 
deficit decreased by at least 1.5 percent of GDP. This 
leaves them with 107 periods of fiscal adjustment.   Such 
an approach contrasts with the narrative approaches 
taken by Romer and Romer (2007) that were meant to 
control for the endogeneity of when to reduce the 
deficit.   These are abrupt changes in GDP, but whether 
or not the primary deficit is being decreased at the 
height of a boom or at the bo!om of a slump remains 
out of the picture.   As we will see, cu!ing at the height 
of a boom characterizes many of their results, and as 
such is not relevant for the current United States.
They adopt a second filter and take the average growth 
rate for the year of the fiscal adjustment and the two 
years following and compare it to the average G7 growth 
rate (weighted by GDP weights) over the same period. 
They identify the top 25% of the di"erence between 
these two growth rates as periods of ‘expansionary fiscal 
adjustments’. Note here that an expansion is doubly 
relative. First, an episode is expansionary if it is in the 
top quartile of the comparisons being made. But the 
economy need not be growing quickly (or indeed at all) 
for this to happen. Second, a country may be growing 
more slowly or even contracting in the three-year period 
(inclusive) following the year of adjustment and be 
considered expansionary if it is growing at a rate that is 
quicker than the G7 growth rate.  This unusual definition 
selects 26 episodes in which fiscal consolidation takes 
place and terms them “expansionary.”
The last filter A& A use to determine whether or not a 
deficit reduction is “successful” is if the cumulative 
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio three years a#er the 
beginning of deficit reduction is greater than 4.5 
percent.  Seventeen out of their 26 examples qualify.
Examining A&A’s 26 Cases
In examining the data more closely, we seek to see how 
much these episodes can be used to provide guidance 
for the U.S. economy.2 At the outset, therefore, we 
should remember where the U.S. economy is and what it 
has just been through. The U.S. underwent a sharp 
recession in the last year, growing at -2% in real terms, 
according to the OECD data that A & A (and we) use 
and was (obviously) lower than the average growth rate 
from 2007 to 2009. (We use 3-year windows to be as 
close to the A & A windows as possible).  The 
unemployment rate is over 9% and probably even higher 
in real terms, since there are far more discouraged 
workers now than in previous periods.  The questions we 
wish to ask are: how many of A & A’s expansionary 
adjustments occurred in similar circumstances and what 
were the outcomes in terms of growth increases in the 
country?
Table 1 below provides such an examination, using their 
26 episodes.  The third column gives the growth rate in 
the year of the fiscal adjustment. The fourth column 
gives the growth rate in the preceding year. The first 
thing to note is that the average real growth rate in the 
year preceding is 4.1% across all episodes. In other 
words, their examples of successful consolidation 
were, on average, growing strongly the year before the 
year of adjustment.  This is, of course, unlike the U.S. 
case today because the country was in recession last 
year.
Furthermore, the growth rate in the year preceding the 
adjustment was higher than the average growth rate for 
the three years preceding the adjustment in most of the 
cases (20 out of 26 cases). Why is this important? 
Because fiscal consolidation in periods of relative booms 
or steady growth is far less likely to be destabilizing than 
such actions in periods of slumps. Indeed, it may be 
standard Keynesian countercyclical policy in some cases. 
Policymakers are far more likely to undertake fiscal 
adjustments and to maintain growth in these 
circumstances than in others.
It should be noted that in fully 7 of the 26 episodes of 
‘expansionary adjustments’ identified by A & A, growth 
in the country actually slowed in the three-year period 
(inclusive) following the adjustment compared to the 
three-year period before the adjustment.    
Indeed, growth actually slowed for 4 of the 6 episodes in 
which consolidation occurred when the growth rate in 
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Country Year R e a l 




G r o w t h 







G r o w t h 
R a t e 
f r o m T 
to T+2
A v e r a g e 
G r o w t h 
Rates from 
(T to T+2) - 
(T-3 to T-1)
Do they cut in a 
slump? (Growth 
T - 1 b e l o w 
average of T-3 to 
T-1?)
Is Average Growth 
H i g h e r i n P o s t 
Adjustment than 
Pre-Adjustment?
Spain 1986 3.3 2.3 2.0 4.6 2.7 No Yes
Spain 1987 5.5 3.3 2.5 5.1 2.7 No Yes
Finland 1973* 7 7.7 5.1 4.0 -1.1 No No
Finland 1996 3.7 3.9 2.2 5.0 2.8 No Yes
Finland 1998 5.2 6.2 4.6 4.7 0.1 No Yes
Finland 2000 5.1 3.9 5.1 3.1 -2.0 Yes No
Greece 1976 6.9 6.4 2.7 5.7 3.0 No Yes
Greece 2005 2.2 4.6 4.6 3.7 -0.9 Yes No
Greece 2006 4.5 2.2 4.2 3.7 -0.6 Yes No
Ireland 1976 1.4 5.7 4.9 5.6 0.7 No Yes
Ireland 1987 4.7 -0.4 2.4 5.2 2.9 Yes Yes
Ireland 1988 5.2 4.7 2.5 6.5 4.0 No Yes
Ireland 1989 5.8 5.2 3.2 5.4 2.2 No Yes
Ireland 2000 9.4 10.7 10.2 7.2 -3.0 No No
Netherlands 1996 3.4 3.1 2.5 3.9 1.4 No Yes
Norway 1979 4.4 3.9 4.6 3.5 -1.1 Yes No
Norway 1980 4.5 4.4 4.1 2.0 -2.1 No No
Norway 1983 3.9 0.1 2.0 5.1 3.0 Yes Yes
Norway 1996 5.1 4.2 4.0 4.4 0.4 No Yes
New Zealand 1993** 6.4 1.1 0.1 5.3 5.2 No Yes
New Zealand 1994 5.3 6.4 2.1 4.3 2.3 No Yes
New Zealand 2000 2.4 5.3 2.5 3.6 1.1 No Yes
Portugal 1986 4.1 2.8 0.2 6.0 5.8 No Yes
Portugal 1988 7.5 6.4 4.4 6.0 1.5 No Yes
Portugal 1995 4.3 1 0.0 4.0 4.0 No Yes
Sweden 2004 4.1 1.9 1.8 3.9 2.1 No Yes
Table 1:   A & A’s Cases of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation
*   Real GDP Growth Was Not Available for 1970 for Finland and Hence the Average Growth Rate from 1970 to 1972 is the Average Growth Rate for 1971 and 1972.
** Real GDP Growth Was Not Available for 1990 for New Zealand and Hence the Average Growth Rate from 1990 to 1992 is the Average Growth Rate for 1989, 1991 and  1992.
the previous year was lower than the three-year average 
preceding consolidation.
So this leaves us with two cases where growth in the 
year prior to the deficit reduction was not higher than 
the previous three years and growth did not slow a#er 
the reduction.   The two cases that successfully cut their 
deficits in a slump without reducing future growth rates 
are:  Norway (1983) and Ireland (1987).
Two Specific Cases
Norway (1983)
Norway (1983) interestingly is not a country that A & A 
classify as a “Successful Fiscal Consolidation”. The 
reason for this is clear from a cursory examination of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1983, the year of consolidation, the 
debt was 20.83% of GDP. This rose about 14 percentage 
points to 34% of GDP by 1986.3
The other case is indeed a case of unusual success.  We 
now take a closer look to see if there are ways in which 
the U.S. can emulate its experience.
Ireland (1987)
Ireland (1987) is the only case of a fiscal adjustment 
when the economy was in a recession the previous year. 
It is also a rather well-known case of fiscal consolidation 
that has been extensively explored by many scholars, 
including Walsh (1993) and Consdine and Du"y (1998).
The Irish struggle over public finances began in 1983 and 
involved two a!empts to consolidate. The first period 
was from 1983 to 1986 and was remarkably unsuccessful. 
The second a!empt, the episode selected by A & A, was 
very successful. It is worthwhile to quote Consdine and 
Du"y more extensively to understand the di"erence 
between these two periods:
 “This  first  a"empt  at  fiscal  stabilisation  coincided  
with  a  downturn  in  domestic  economic  activity  and  
an  international  economic  environment  that  was  less  
favourable  than  in  the  second  half  of  the  decade.    
The  second  adjustment  was  preceded  by  a  massive  
10%  devaluation  of  the  Irish  pound  within  the  
European  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  in  August  1986.  
This devaluation  combined  with  positive implications of 
the fiscal adjustment for foreign direct investment helped 
the  performance  of  Irish  exports.   Investment  was  
further  aided  by  the  continued reduction of the 
interest di#erential with Germany, while exports were 
aided by the ‘Lawson Boom’ in Britain (Ireland’s largest 
trading partner at the time).”
As Walsh (1993) shows, the variables in question had 
sharp movements.   The DM/Pound interest rate fell 
from about 3 DM/Irish Pound to about 2.7 DM/Irish 
Pound in 1986 (and stayed at that level for a few more 
years). The interest rate di"erential between Ireland and 
Germany and between Ireland and the UK fell sharply. It 
dropped from 10% to 5% between mid 1986 and early 
1988 for the Irish-German Di"erential and from about 
3.5 % to -1% in the case of the Irish-UK interest rate over 
the same period.  Figure 1 is taken from Walsh (1993):
Figure 1. Irish Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
It is not immediately obvious how the growth 
experiences of a country with a population roughly the 
size of Chicago’s that is undergoing a massive exchange 
rate devaluation, while its closest trading partner is 
undergoing a once-in-a-decade boom, while also 
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witnessing a decline of about 5% in the interest rate 
di"erential between it and the benchmark interest rates 
over the course of a year, is a suitable example to hold 
up for the U.S. today. The U.S. today has the benchmark 
rate and its interest rate is at the zero bound.  In 
addition, the U.S. is a large country that cannot rely 
extensively on export-led growth—especially when its 
major trading partners are also undergoing recessionary 
conditions. 
A Special Case:  Portugal (1995)
One of the cases that does not make it through the filter 
we apply but needs further examination is Portugal in 
1995. Portugal was growing at only 1% in the year 
preceding consolidation and had undergone a recession 
two years earlier (in 1993). It therefore bears further 
examination.  As Jorge Correia da Cunha and Cláudia 
Rodrigues Braz show, Portugal’s contractionary fiscal 
stance in 1995 as part of its a!empt to join the ERM was 
followed by smaller expansionary stances for the next 3 
years. But the key di"erence  with the U.S. today was 
the ability to lower interest rates and encourage private 
investment. Portugal had an interest rate profile in 
1995-2000 as follows:
Table 2:   Portugal (1995) Interest Rates








(Data from OECD Stat.)
Once again, there was considerable leeway to lower 
interest rates—a policy unavailable to the U.S. today.
All Cases
In the second step, A & A filtered their results from 107 
adjustments to 26.   We now turn to the full panel of 107 
adjustments to undertake this examination. First, for 
most of the cases, consolidation did not take place in a 
slump.  The following table shows the 48 episodes in 
which deficits were cut in a slump:
Table 3: Cases of Consolidation when the Deficit was 




Belgium 1982, 1987, 2006








Italy 1976, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997
Japan 1984, 1999, 2006
Netherlands 1973, 1983, 1988, 1993
Norway 1979, 1983, 1989, 2000, 2004
New Zealand 1987, 1989
Portugal 1982, 1983, 1992, 2002
Sweden 1981, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1997
Total Cases 48
Of these, more than half saw reductions in their growth 
rates in the years following compared with the years 
preceding. The remaining 23 are listed in the table 
below.
Table 4: Cases Where Fiscal Consolidation Occurred in 



















Norway 1983, 1989, 2004
New Zealand 1989
Sweden 1986, 1994, 1997
Total Cases 23
Of these, most of the countries that have the requisite 
data (data is missing for debt-to-GDP ratios in the 
OECD tables for many years prior to 1980) experienced 
rises in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the years following the 
adjustment—suggesting that growth increases were 
insu$cient to generate the revenues required to reduce 
debt. We are le# then with 8 cases.
Table 5: Cases Where Fiscal Consolidation Occurred in 










Of these only two, Norway in 1989 and Ireland in 1987, 
are examples that approximate the U.S. experience 
today, in that they both experienced recessions in the 
year prior to consolidation. We have already considered 
the case of Ireland. We are quite puzzled by the 
classification of the Norwegian case of 1989 as an 
example of a fiscal adjustment. We were unable to 
obtain cyclically adjusted primary balances from the 
OECD website before 1992, but other information 
available makes it somewhat implausible that this year 
should be seen as a period of consolidation. It should be 
noted that A & A use a di"erent definition of cyclical 
fiscal variables, and this is possibly the source of the 
contradiction.4
As researchers at the University of Oslo and Research 
Statistics, Norway show, 1989 was the first year of a very 
strong expansionary policy in Norway as a reaction to 
the recession of 1988. They note that between 1988 and 
1991, “The cyclically adjusted primary deficit increased 
by 3.8%per cent of trend GDP”.5
Such a trend is consistent with the OECD’s data on the 
cyclically adjusted government primary balance that we 
were able to obtain from an online source drawn from 
previous reports of the OECD. %According to this data, 
the Norwegian primary balance went from a 3.0% 
surplus relative to trend GDP to a -8.1% deficit by 1991. In 
1989, there was a modest decline in the surplus relative 
to 1988 of 0.1% of trend GDP—a mild expansion. The 
table is reproduced below for the relevant years.
Table 6: Cyclically-adjusted general government primary 
balances [Surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percent of 
potential GDP, excludes revenues from Petroleum.]







The idea that 1989 was a year of fiscal policy expansion, 
not contraction, is further supported by Braconier and 
Holden (1999). They show that 1989 and later years saw 
sharp increases in the discretionary budget for 
Copyright 2010, the Roosevelt Institute.  All rights reserved.  
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expansion. Figure 2, drawn from that paper, makes the 
point more clearly. 
Figure 2: Norway’s expansion 1989-1991
Looking at the broad spectrum of examples, we cannot 
find a situation in which cu!ing the deficit in the middle 
of a slump resulted in growth without also devaluing the 
currency, increasing debt-to-GDP ratios or decreasing 
interest rates.
An Additional Test Using a Longer Window
We turn now to another filter that is perhaps more 
appropriate for determining whether a cut is occurring 
in a slump.  We have thus far been trying to maintain 
consistency with the three year window used by A & A. 
Instead of taking the growth rate in the previous year 
and comparing it to the average growth rate over the 
last three years, we now compare it to the last five years. 
The idea is to have a more robust idea of the trend 
growth rate in the economy .  It should be noted that the 
U.S. is indeed in a position where the growth rate in the 
previous year was well below the five year average from 
2005-2009 (inclusive). In the following table we ask the 
same questions that we have asked above.
First, it is important to see that fiscal consolidations very 
rarely occur when the growth rate in the year before is 
lower than the 5 year average preceding the 
consolidation. This occurs for only 8 cases out of 107 
where adequate data are available.  In 4 of the cases, 
the economy is growing robustly in the year preceding. 
In only one case, Ireland in 1987, did the economy 
recently undergo a recession. One case out 107 
resembles the U.S. (superficially), and as we have 
showed above, the latitude a"orded to policy makers in 
that case was far more than what is available to the U.S. 
today.




when Growth in 
year t-1 was 
lower than 







years t to t+2 
exceed GDP 
growth in 
years t-3 to 
t-1?
Finland 2000 3.9 No
Greece 2006 2.2 No
Ireland 1987 -0.4 Yes
Norway 1979 3.9 No
Norway 1980 4.4 No
Norway 1983 0.1 Yes
Portugal 1995 1 Yes
Sweden 2004 1.9 Yes
Conclusion
We are living in extraordinary times. This is the largest 
recession since the Great Depression.   A large part of 
the rest of the world is also undergoing a sharp 
downturn.  There is a genuine and reasonable concern 
that public intervention will replace the private debt 
overload with a sovereign debt overload.  As such, 
sound policy advice requires that we recognize what 
historical examples are relevant for our current situation.
The A & A data do not appear to provide much solace in 
this regard.   Their examples of successful consolidation 
are typically conditional on cu!ing a deficit during a 
boom and not during a slump. There may be situations in 
which consolidation does indeed result in be!er 
outcomes, but those do not apply to the U.S. at the 
moment. It is not clear that immediate fiscal 
consolidation will do much to alleviate that worry. 
Without robust growth, there is li!le hope of the debt-
to-GDP ratio falling. The hope in undertaking such steps 
is for private investment to be reignited by increased 
trust and faith in the viability of government finances. 
While this may be a reasonable hope in some situations, 
the prospects for such a revival in the U.S. appear bleak.
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Paper has been updated with fixes to typos in text, forma"ing 
in Table 1 and references to a count of total examples in text. 
Endnotes
1.  For example see David Brooks (2010), who 
approvingly citing Alberto Alesina’s paper and 
suggesting that it be taken as guidance for the US. 
2. Ryan Avent (2010) has considered a couple of 
examples that A & A use and suggests that they are not 
very useful for policy guidance. We argue that virtually 
none of the cases they look at are.
3.  This is most likely because the lower addition to debt 
was not matched by a su$ciently large addition to GDP 
to reduce the debt.
4. A & A correct various components of the government 
budget for year to year changes in the unemployment 
rate. As they note : “More precisely, the cyclically 
adjusted value of the change in a fiscal variable is the 
di"erence between a measure of the fiscal variable in 
period t computed as if the unemployment rate were 
equal to the one in t & 1 and the actual value of the fiscal 
variable in year t & 1.  We prefer this method to more 
complicated measures like those produced by the 
OECD because the la!er are a bit of a black box based 
upon many assumptions about fiscal multipliers upon 
which there is much uncertainty.” (page 7)).
5. By the OECD definition. By the government’s own 
statistics, the expansion was even larger. 
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